

## Message Text

SECRET

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44

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 ADP-00 PM-09 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 PRS-01 ACDA-19 GAC-01 MBFR-03 SAI-01

RSR-01 EB-11 OMB-01 TRSE-00 AEC-11 /130 W

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R 301845 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4214

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION BERLIN

USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BONN 4735

HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL; USBER ALSO  
FOR AMBASSADOR; SHAPE FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: X- GDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, GW

SUBJECT: EUGENE ROSTOW MEETING WITH FRG STATE SECRETARY FRANK

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING HIS PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN-  
AMERICAN CONFERENCE AT AMSTERDAM, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY  
, ACCOMPANIED BY EMBOFF, HAD WIDE- RANGING TOUR  
D' HORIZON IN BONN MARCH 30 WITH FONOFF STATE SECRETARY  
FRANK. DISCUSSION CENTERED ON US/ EUROPEAN RELATIONS,  
US TROOP PRESENCE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A EUROPEAN  
NUCLEAR FORCE, EC POLITICAL COOPERATION, SUPER POWER  
, AND SOVIET FORCES ALONG THE CHINESE BORDER.

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HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOW. END SUMMARY.

1. FRANK TOLD ROSTOW HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE PRESENTLY WAS A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES AND THAT, GIVEN THE ENORMOUS RECIPROCAL INTERESTS OF THE US AND EUROPE IN EACH OTHERS SECURITY AND PROSPERITY, SUCH A CRISIS WOULD NOT OCCUR AS LONG AS THE BASIC NATO FRAMEWORK WAS MAINTAINED AND VIABLE. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, WAS THAT THE INEVITABLE YET HARMEFUL FRICTIONS STEMMING FROM OCCASIONALLY CONFLICTING NATIONAL INTERESTS NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET OUT OF CONTROL. WHILE BOTH SIDES HAD THEIR DOMESTIC ECONOMIC INTERESTS TO PROTECT, FRANK EMPHASIZED THAT THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF A LARGER POLITICAL CONTEXT. IF THIS WAS DONE, THEN AS IN THE MONETARY FIELD, AGREEMENTS COULD BE REACHED. BUT FRANK AGREED WITH ROSTOW'S OBSERVATION THAT DIFFERENCES ON THE TWO SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC COULD REINFORCE EACH OTHER AND TEND TO ERODE FAMILIAR BASES FOR TRANS-ATLANTIC COOPERATION.

2. IN FRANK'S VIEW IT WAS ESSENTIAL, AT ALL COSTS, THAT SUCH A SCENARIO BE AVOIDED. FRANK AND ROSTOW AGREED THAT MANY OF THE BASIC PREMISES OF 1949, IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC AS WELL AS DOMESTIC FIELDS, WERE NOW OBSOLETE. BOTH THEREFORE STRONGLY AGREED THAT NEW FORMULAE AND ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND TO GUARANTEE, 28 YEARS AFTER THE WAR, THAT THE US AND WEST EUROPE WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY TO ASSURE SECURITY OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. IN THIS CONNECTION, FRANK ECHOED THE ANALYSIS IN 'S AMSTERDAM SPEECH, NAMELY, THAT THERE " COULD BE NO NINETEENTH CENTURY BALANCE OF POWER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND WEST EUROPE". WHILE SUCH A RELATIONSHIP MIGHT HAVE CERTAIN LIMITED USES BETWEEN THE US AND RUSSIA OR BETWEEN THE US ( RUSSIA) AND CHINA, SUCH A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMERICA AND WEST EUROPE OR BETWEEN AMERICAN AND JAPAN WOULD HAVE VERY NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON THE SECURITY OF THE WEST.

3. FROM THE GERMAN STANDPOINT, FRANK WANTED TO SAY THAT THERE WERE TWO ESSENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATIONS THAT EMERGED FROM WORLD WAR II. THE FIRST WAS THE EMPHASIS ON EUROPEAN UNIFICATION. AND BONN  
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WAS PLEASED THAT THE EC POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS HAD SO

FAR DEVELOPED QUITE WELL, WITH THE EMPHASIS ON PRAGMATIC COOPERATION RATHER THAN ON PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS. FRANK THOUGHT THE POSITIVE RESULTS TO DATE IN HELSINKI REPRESENTED THE FIRST VISIBLE SUCCESS IN THIS CONNECTION. THE FRG WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH THE COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE OF THE NEUTRALS IN HELSINKI.

4. THE SECOND ESSENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY RESULT OF WORLD WAR II, SAID FRANK, WAS THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY THE US AND GERMANY BECAME AND HAVE REMAINED ALLIES. IT IS ESSENTIAL, CONTINUED FRANK, THAT BONN AND WASHINGTON ALWAYS RECOGNIZE THAT THE NATURE OF THE US/ WEST EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT THAN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EITHER THE US OR THE FRG WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN REPLY TO ROSTOW' S QUERY, FRANK ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS A DEGREE OF FEAR WITHIN WEST EUROPE OVER THE DEVELOPING SUPER POWER RELATIONSHIP. FRANK SAID HE PERSONALLY WAS NOT DISTURBED THAT THE TWO GREAT POWERS WERE IN DIALOGUE AND HE FULLY CREDITED US STATEMENTS THAT THERE HAD BEEN AND WOULD BE NO US/ SOVIET DEAL THAT WOULD FAIL TO TAKE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF VITAL FRG SECURITY INTERESTS. BUT FRANK SAID HE BELIEVES THERE WAS AN INHERENT PROBLEM IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANY SUPER POWER AND ITS SMALLER ALLIED PARTNERS BECAUSE A SUPER POWER HAS GEO- POLITICAL INTERESTS THAT EXTEND FARTHER AND WHICH MAY CONFLICT WITH THE INTERESTS OF ITS SMALLER PARTNERS. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO KEEP THIS PARTICULAR CONUNDRUM IN MIND.

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INR-10 NSAE-00 PRS-01 ACDA-19 GAC-01 MBFR-03 SAI-01

RSR-01 AEC-11 EB-11 TRSE-00 OMB-01 /130 W

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R 301845 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4215

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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USMISSION BERLIN

USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS

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5. AT THIS POINT, ROSTOW NOTED THE WIDELY PUBLICIZED SPEECH IN AMSTERDAM BY GEORGE BALL, WHO CHARGED THAT EUROPEANS HAD BECOME TOO "PROVINCIAL" AND WERE FOCUSING TOO EXCLUSIVELY ON THEIR "OWN LITTLE CORNER OF THE WORLD", THEREBY LEAVING THE US WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR WIDER WORLD PROBLEMS. ROSTOW SAID THAT PORTION OF BALL'S SPEECH WAS TO A LARGE EXTENT ADDED AT DEAN RUSK'S SUGGESTION, WHICH ROSTOW PASSED TO BALL. ROSTOW SAID HE SHARED THE RUSK/BALL MESSAGE THAT EUROPE MUST NOT PERMIT ITS INSULARITY AND ATTENTION TO DOMESTIC CONCERNS TO LEAVE THE US ALONE IN THE WORLD AT A TIME WHEN THE US WISHES TO TRIM ITS OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS. SUCH AN APPROACH COULD ONLY ENHANCE THE DANGERS OF US ISOLATIONISM, SOMETHING THE PRESIDENT IS VIGOROUSLY  
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SEEKING TO COMBAT. AS A PARTICULAR EXAMPLE, ROSTOW URGED THAT THE EUROPEANS TAKE JAPAN MORE INTO ACCOUNT IN FORMULATING THE POLICY OF THE WEST IN THE TRADE AND MONETARY AREAS AS WELL AS VIS-A-VIS THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

6. FRANK ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS ASPECT OF THE BALL CRITIQUE HIT RATHER CLOSE TO THE MARK. FOR THIS REASON, THE FRG WAS STRONGLY FAVORING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MORE

ORGANIZED AND EFFICIENT US/ EUROPEAN DIALOGUE. ROSTOW INDICATED THAT WHAT WAS NECESSARY WAS FOR THE EUROPEANS TO MAKE THEIR SUGGESTIONS TO WASHINGTON IN A UNIFIED FASHION; IF EUROPE TOOK THE INITIATIVE, THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE RESPONSIVE.

7. AT ROSTOW' S REQUEST, FRANK REVIEWED THE GERMAN CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO MBFR, STRESSING THAT BONN SAW FORCE REDUCTIONS AS ONLY ONE PART OF A LARGER CONCEPT THAT ALSO INCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRAINTS, CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, ETC. FRANK SAID THE KEY WOULD BE THAT ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY NOT BE DISTURBED IN THIS DIPLOMATIC UNDERTAKING. FRANK SAID HE HAD RECENTLY INFORMED AN AMERICAN VISITOR, WHO HAD ASKED CONCERNING THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WITHDRAWAL OF MOST US TROOPS IN A FEW YEARS, THAT SUCH AN ACTION WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF EXPANDING SOVIET POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCE OVER THE WHOLE OF WESTERN EUROPE. FRANK EMPHASIZED THAT THIS COULD NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC.

8. FRANK WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO DISPARAGE THE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE AS A ALTERNATIVE TO THE COMBINED US STRATEGIC/ TACTICAL/ CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE DETERRENT. FRANK REPEATED THREE TIMES THAT HE HAD NEVER BELIEVED IN THE EFFICIENCY OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENT.

9. ASKED BY ROSTOW FOR HIS ASSESSMENT CONCERNING SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF SOME 50 DIVISIONS TO SIBERIA, FRANK SAID HE ALSO CONSIDERED THIS DEVELOPMENT TO BE OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE, NOTING THAT SOVIET FORCE LEVELS ALONG THE CHINESE BORDER CONTINUE TO INCREASE.

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FRANK SAID HE HAD HEARD A COUPLE OF THEORIES TO EXPLAIN THE SOVIET ACTIONS. THE FIRST WAS THAT MOSCOW WAS PREPARING FOR MAO' S DEATH, WITH THE HOPE THAT THESE MILITARY FORCES WOULD AFFORD RUSSIA SUFFICIENT POLITICAL PRESENCE TO SWAY PEKING BACK TO A FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR IN THE PERIOD OF CONFUSION THAT MIGHT ACCOMPANY THE CHANGING OF THE CHINESE POLITICAL GUARD. SECOND, SOME GERMAN EXPERTS SPECULATED THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR THE SOVIETS SINCE CHINA WOULD AT SOME POINT DEVELOP A SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY. FRANK ADDED THAT A SENIOR RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIAL HAD INFORMED HIM SOME MONTHS AGO OF A CONVERSATION THAT THE RUMANIAN HAD WITH A SOVIET GENERAL IN MOSCOW, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIETS ALSO FEARED THAT CHINA MIGHT

AT SOME POINT SEND AS MANY AS 50 MILLION PRIVATE  
CITIZENS WITHOUT ARMS TO SETTLE IN THE USSR. THE  
SOVIET GENERAL REPORTEDLY SAID MOSCOW SIMPLY DID NOT  
KNOW HOW THEY COULD DEAL WITH SUCH A CONTINGENCY.  
HILLENBRAND.

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\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* SECRET

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**To:** EUR  
HELSINKI  
HONG KONG  
LONDON  
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ROME

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WASHDC

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